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ABSTRACT Existing theories relate higher education to lower crime rates, yet we have limited evidence on 
the crime-reducing effect of education in developing countries. We contribute to this literature by examining the 
effect of education on homicide in Mexico, where homicide rates decreased by nearly 55 percent from 1992 to 
2007, before the surge of drug-related violence. We argue that a large amount of this reduction followed 
a compulsory schooling law at the secondary level in 1993, when the government undertook key education 
reforms to promote development and economic integration. We employ different empirical strategies that 
combine regression analysis, placebo tests, and an instrumental variable approach, and find that attendance 
in secondary and tertiary schools has a negative effect on homicide rates before the onset of the Drug War, 
although the evidence for secondary enrolment is more robust. This effect vanishes after the drug war onset, 
indicating that school attendance has different effects on different types of criminal activity. These findings 
suggest that policy makers can reduce crime and traditional forms of interpersonal violence by strengthening the 
education system.
KEYWORDS: Crime; homicide; education; school enrolment; drug war; Mexico
1. Introduction
Does education decrease homicide and improve individual security? This is a question with sig-
nificant policy relevance as many developing countries have suffered from high rates of homicide 
over the past decades, with profound negative externalities on human and economic development 
(WB, 2017). Moreover, if advances in school attendance lower crime rates, then improving access to 
education provides a possible avenue to enhance individual security, and a reduction in crime can be 
an important byproduct of government efforts to expand education.
Existing theories highlight plausible reasons for why education can decrease crime: school 
attendance rises the opportunity costs of crime and dissuades participation in criminal activity (e.g. 
Ehrlich, 1975), it reduces the availability of time to get involved in criminal activity (e.g. Lochner, 
2004), and it strengthens informal constraints that prevent potential offenders from committing 
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a crime (e.g. Hirschi, 1969). Despite the relevance of this literature, however, there is a lack of 
systematic research on the link between education and crime in developing countries. Previous 
studies on the subject largely focus on advanced democracies, without considering whether the 
effects of education policy and schooling on crime also extend to developing countries (e.g. Jacob 
& Lefgren, 2003; Lochner & Moretti, 2004; Machin, Marie, & Vujić, 2011; see also Juaraez, Urdal, 
& Vadlamannati, 2020). The few studies focusing on developing countries show mixed results. Some 
suggest that education decreases violent crime (e.g. Fajnzylber, Lederman, & Loayza, 2002a; Rivera, 
2016), while others find no effect (e.g. Fajnzylber, Lederman, & Loayza, 2002b; Kim & Pridemore, 
2005).
To examine the effect of education on homicide, we exploit a compulsory schooling law at the 
secondary level introduced in Mexico in 1993. This law was implemented by the hegemonic one- 
party regime to promote development and economic integration, and provides an independent 
increase in enrolment rates in secondary and tertiary schools not likely to be correlated with other 
factors influencing homicide. Taking advantage of the raise in education following the reform, we 
employ different empirical strategies to assess the effect of education on homicide rates. Since the 
compulsory schooling reform was national and implemented in all Mexican states, our empirical 
estimates identify the size of the cohort treated by the reform and the growth in the number of 
secondary schools. This approach strengthens our main results by allowing us to capture exogenous 
variation over time and across units.
We show attendance in secondary and tertiary schools has a negative effect on homicide rates, 
although the results for secondary enrolment are more robust. This effect vanishes after the onset of 
the drug war, when the quantity and quality of homicide violence dramatically changed as a result of 
confrontations between drug criminal organisations. Our results suggest that school attendance has 
different effects on different types of criminal activity. While the expansion of education is important 
in its own right, the results suggest that policy makers can also expect welfare policies aimed at 
strengthening the education system to decrease crime (e.g. Eisner, 2015; Rivera & Zarate-Tenorio, 
2016). Our analysis indicates that strategies outside law enforcement can also have substantial effects 
on the reduction of crime in late development countries, where there is ample scope for implementing 
better welfare policies.
2. The decline in homicide before the drug war onset
The outbreak of the Mexican Drug War has gained considerable attention from academics and policy 
makers (see Shirk & Wallman, 2015). This is not surprising, given the magnitude and brutality of 
drug-related violence. Moreover, the wave of violence came after Mexico’s transition to democracy 
in 2000 and seems to run counter to common arguments relating democracy to lower crime (e.g. 
Eisner, 2003). In our view, however, it is rather striking that previous studies largely ignored why 
violent crime declined sharply before the drug war.
Figure 1 shows time series data for violent crime between 1990 and 2015, as measured by the 
number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.1 Three aspects stand out. First, homicide rates were 
very high in the early 1990s, peaking in 1992 at 19 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and then fell 
steadily from 19 to 8.6 between 1992 and 2007, a reduction of nearly 55 per cent.2 Second, the 
government’s war against drug cartels reversed prior advances in individual security, provoking a fast 
and large growth of violence, which rose to a peak of almost 27 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 
2010. Third, the average homicide rate during the Mexican Drug War (19.1) is comparable to the 
average homicide rate in the early 1990s, although there are noticeable differences in the type of 
violence in these periods. Whereas homicidal violence before the war on drugs tended to result from 
non-organised interpersonal violence, battles between well-armed criminal groups and/or confronta-
tions with the state security apparatus have figured prominently in the drug war.
There is also significant spatial variation in homicide rates before and after the onset of the 
Mexican Drug War. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the percentage change in homicide rates in 
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all of Mexico’s 31 states and Mexico City from 1992 to 2006, illustrating the magnitude of the 
homicide decline described above. It demonstrates that the reduction in homicide encompassed the 
whole country, except Chihuahua – a Northern border state where homicide rates increased 
5.4 per cent – and Nuevo León, where a relatively low homicide rate at the outset did not change.
Even more surprising is the scale of the reduction, as half of the states experienced a decline in 
homicide rates of more than 50 per cent; two thirds of all states experienced a reduction of at least 
30 per cent between 1992 and 2006. The rightmost column presents the homicide rate average over 
the period 2007–2015. Violence has tended to be concentrated in seven states, which account for 
nearly 54 per cent of all homicides (i.e. Chihuahua, Baja California, Guerrero, Estado de México, 
Jalisco, Nuevo León, and Sinaloa). These figures show how drug-related violence has been largely 
confined to a handful of states and not engulfed the entire country, as sometimes implied by 
descriptions of Mexico as a case of ‘state failure’ (e.g. Carpenter, 2015). In brief, we see divergent 
trends in homicide within Mexico that resemble the spatial concentration of violence in many 
countries with ongoing civil wars (Cederman & Gleditsch, 2009).
Although there is much research on the surge of drug-related violence, existing studies ignore 
why homicide rates dropped sharply before the Mexican Drug War. The few studies analysing 
trends in violent crime before the drug war highlight an increase in homicide related due to 
subnational democratisation (Villarreal, 2002). Others emphasise the growing power of drug cartels 
in the mid-nineties and link this to a surge in homicide (Chabat, 2002). These studies may help 
explain why violent crime increased in the 1990s, but overlook the fact that homicide fell before the 
drug war.
What thus explains the general and steady decline in homicide before the drug war? Leading 
theories examine crime as a function of criminal-justice systems and legitimate labour market 
opportunities (Chalfin & McCrary, 2017). Although we do not dismiss the relevance of these factors, 
we believe that neither the criminal-justice system nor labour market opportunities can offer 
a satisfactory explanation for the large, widespread, and sustained decline in homicide before the 
drug war. Indeed, ineffectiveness and corruption have been persistent and widespread in Mexico’s 
criminal-justice system and are generally considered a main cause of the state’s lack of capacity to 
deter, prosecute, and punish criminal activity (Shirk, 2010). The decline in homicide appears to have 
Figure 1. Homicide Rate in Mexico, 1990–2014.  
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taken place in spite of the weakness of the judicial system, suggesting that law enforcement policies 
cannot account for the large reduction in homicide. Similarly, it seems unlikely that favourable 
economic conditions could account for such a decline since Mexico experienced economic crises in 
1994 and 2001, with severe consequences for employment and sustained low economic growth while 
homicide rates were falling steadily. In this article, we argue that the homicide decline at least in part 
can be attributed to the expansion of secondary and tertiary education across the country.
3. Education policy under authoritarianism
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) established one of the most durable authoritarian regimes 
in the 20th century, holding onto power from 1929 until 2000. Since the origins of the one-party 
hegemonic regime, education policy aimed at consolidating the post-revolutionary nationalism 
embraced by the PRI. Drawing on the ideals of the Mexican Revolution, in 1934 President Lázaro 
Cárdenas amended Article 3 of the Constitution, establishing that public education would be socialist 
and that the state would take control of basic and teacher education. Although President Manuel Avila 
Camacho suppressed the socialist character of public education in 1946, education policy continued 
to be oriented towards strengthening the post-revolutionary ideology and consolidating nation- 
building until the very end of the authoritarian regime. Since the beginning of authoritarianism, 
moreover, education policy was largely focused on fighting illiteracy and expanding primary educa-
tion in rural and urban areas (Carranza, 2008). The emphasis on basic education is not surprising, 
since the education system was ruined at the end of the Revolution and two thirds of the population 
were illiterate in the 1920s (Moctezuma, 1993).
Education policy under the PRI produced mixed results. Illiteracy rates declined from 68 per cent 
to 12 per cent between 1921 and 1990, and enrolment in primary schools increased from 20 per cent 
to almost 95 per cent over the same period. However, a significant number of students did not 
complete primary education – the 1990 national census showed that nearly 12 million people started 
primary school but did not finish.3 Moreover, by the late 1980s, one third of the population in 
secondary school age did not have access to secondary education, and two thirds of the population in 
tertiary school age did not attend tertiary education. Against this context, President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari (1988–1994) promoted several reforms intended to raise educational attendance and trans-
form the education system.
Salinas took power after a highly contested presidential election in 1988, when many observers 
alleged that the PRI engaged in electoral fraud to deny a likely victory for the opposition challenger 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. The hallmark of the Salinas government was a modernisation project aimed 
at improving competitiveness and incorporating the country into the international economy. In his 
1989 Annual Report, President Salinas stressed his conviction that ‘education is an irreplaceable 
condition for economic and social modernization, it is the sector with the highest priority in the 
government’s duties’. Two years later, Salinas highlighted how better education will mean a more 
equal distribution of income and will allow taking advantage of the opportunities opened by 
economic interconnectedness.4 Consistent with this, the Mexican government increased education 
expenditures from 3.3 per cent of the GDP in 1988 to 5.2 per cent in 1993. Furthermore, the 
government undertook major reforms to decentralise the education system and expand secondary 
and tertiary school attendance. In 1992, the federal government transferred its responsibility over 
basic and teacher education to subnational governments across the country.5 The rationale of the 
reform was that a highly centralised structure had prevented progress of public education and had 
enabled the National Union of Educational Workers (SNTE) to gain control over the education 
system.
A second major reform of the education system came in 1993, when Article 3 of the Constitution 
was amended to establish that secondary education should be compulsory. This represented 
a significant change in education policy, as it forced the government to guarantee the supply of 
educational opportunities for the secondary school aged population across the country. Importantly, 
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the reform was not purely centred on secondary education but targeted tertiary levels too, since 
government expected to increase enrolment rates in higher levels of education – most notably tertiary 
education – by increasing attendance in secondary schools (Moctezuma, 1993). Moreover, the 
education policy introduced by President Salinas was sustained by his successor President Ernesto 
Zedillo, who helped to deepen and consolidate the modernisation project in the 1990s (Latapí, 
2004).6
Figure 2 displays time series data for secondary and tertiary school enrolment between 1990 and 2015. 
It demonstrates how the compulsory schooling reform had a strong positive effect on school attendance in 
secondary education, rising from 66 per cent in 1992 to 84 per cent in 2000 when the PRI was defeated. It 
also reveals a very similar pattern for school enrolment in tertiary education, increasing from 29 per cent 
to 43 per cent over the same period. In absolute terms, the number of students in secondary schools 
increased from approximately 4,200,000 to 5,300,000 and from 1,800,000 to 2,600,000 in tertiary 
schools. Note that nearly 50 per cent of the increase in secondary and tertiary school enrolment between 
1992 and 2000 is observed immediately in the first three years of the reform.7
The reform increased attention to education in general and encouraged tertiary enrolment, but 
above all it accelerated continuation rates, which increased by 7 percentage points (from 75%-82%) 
in the years before the reform (1990–1994) and by a 12 percentage points (from 82%-94%) from 
1994–1997. Overall, although our data do not extend further back than 1990, Figure 2 suggests that 
the reform increased enrolment in secondary and tertiary schools, and that changes in enrolment rates 
do not simply reflect prior increasing trends in school enrolment. Indeed, alternative data compiled by 
UNESCO indicate an actual drop in secondary enrolment during the early 1980s and confirm 
a plateau in the early 1990s (see the Online Appendix, Figure A1).8 Importantly, the large and steady 
expansion of school attendance was also widespread and took place throughout the country (see the 
Online Appendix, Figures A2-A3).
4. Education and crime
We review in this section the theoretical literature on the education–crime nexus and detail a number 
of mechanisms through which educational attendance can influence individual decisions with regards 
to crime: deterrence, incapacitation, and social bonds.
Figure 2. Enrolment in secondary and tertiary schools in Mexico, 1990–2015.  
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A first mechanism through which education can affect crime is deterrence. Economic theory 
suggests that criminal behaviour is rational and responds to incentives shaping the expected costs 
and benefits of crime. Becker’s (1968) economic model proposes a scenario where individuals decide 
whether to get involved in criminal activities by assessing the potential costs and benefits associated 
with committing a crime and predicts that crime is more likely when the expected benefits outweigh 
the expected costs. From this perspective, individual decisions to engage in crime are determined by 
the utility related to abstaining from crime, the probability of apprehension, and the severity of 
punishment. A vast literature relates the utility of keeping away from crime to legal wages earned in 
the labour market, whereby increases in legal wages should lower crime by decreasing the relative 
benefits of crime (e.g. Ehrlich, 1973).
Related research emphasises how the expected economic costs associated with less years of 
education can deter or dissuade individuals from participating in criminal activity. Put differently, 
the expected economic losses as a result of the lack of education or lower levels of school attendance 
can help prevent criminal involvement and the commission of crime. Specifically, education can 
affect individual decisions about crime through its effect on actors’ expectations about further returns 
of schooling, namely lowering the risk of unemployment and increasing future income. Economic 
theory anticipates that education raises individual patience and risk aversion, because education is 
expected to improve employment opportunities and higher wages in the legal labour market. Such 
expectations about the payoffs of education will in turn affect decisions about crime by raising the 
opportunity costs as well as the utility of abstaining from it (e.g. Ehrlich, 1975; Lochner, 2004; 
Lochner & Moretti, 2004). This explanation echoes an earlier sociological literature that points to the 
role of social bonds, suggesting that a commitment to future goals that are related to schooling can 
help prevent individuals from committing criminal acts (Hirschi, 1969).
Other explanations suggest that education affects crime through incapacitation. Much research 
points to the role of criminal-judicial systems, suggesting that increasing incarceration rates should 
lower crime rates. One reason for this is that offenders are taken out of the streets, without 
opportunity of getting involved and committing further criminal actions while imprisoned (e.g. 
Barbarino & Mastrobuoni, 2014; Marvell & Moody, 1994). Others argue that schooling can have 
an incapacitation effect since potential offenders – most notably young actors – spent more time at 
the school, reducing the available time for engaging in criminal activity (e.g. Hirschi, 1969; Jacob & 
Lefgren, 2003). This literature suggests that the probability of participation in criminal activities will 
be lower for individuals attending school relative to those not enrolled and highlights how states can 
deter crime by strengthening criminal-judicial institutions (sticks) and also contain crime by improv-
ing educational attendance (carrots).
A third explanation emphasises how education shapes criminal or deviant behaviour by strength-
ening individuals’ attachment to social norms and social institutions. Following Durkheim’s pioneer-
ing argument that ‘the more weakened the groups to which [the individual] belong, the less he 
depends on them, the more he consequently depends only on himself and recognizes no other rules of 
conduct than what are founded on his private interests’ (quoted in LaFree, 1998, p. 66), social bond 
theory looks highlights the relevance of informal mechanisms of social control that help prevent 
deviant behaviour (Hirschi, 1969). From this perspective, individuals do not choose to participate in 
criminal actions because the expected utility of crime is high, but because social bonds and informal 
mechanisms of control are weak. To the extent that attachment to other social actors and institutions 
like parents, schools, and peers contributes to build and strengthen social relationships and con-
formity with social norms, schooling is expected to generate and consolidate informal constraints on 
criminal behaviour (e.g. Hirschi, 1969).
The key implication of these theories is that individuals attending school should be less likely to 
engage in criminal activities relative to those with no access or less education. Although existing 
explanations focus on the micro-level relationship between education and propensity to engage in 
crime, the theoretical literature implies aggregate effects of school attendance on the supply of crime. 
Specifically, these explanations have strong predictive power and can account for the large and 
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sustained decline in violent crime before the Mexican Drug War for two reasons: (a) the profile of 
actors participating in criminal activity and (b) the age composition of the country’s population. First, 
empirical studies demonstrate that age is among the strongest and most robust correlates of non- 
violent and violent crime. Much research shows that adolescents (aged 13–17) and young adults 
(aged 18–24) are much more likely to engage in deviant behaviour and criminal activities (e.g. 
Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983; Piquero, Farrington, & Blumstein, 2007), including homicide (e.g. 
Blumstein & Rosenfeld, 1998; Cook & Laub, 1998). In fact, the age distribution of crime has been 
referred as a ‘law of nature’, suggesting that more youth-dominant populations face the highest risk 
of crime involvement (Goring 1913, quoted in Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983).
Second, in 1990 adolescents and young adults represented 17.8 and 21.5 per cent of the total adult 
population (13 years and above) in Mexico, respectively. This means that nearly 40 per cent of the 
total adult population fell in the cohort where individuals are most at risk of getting involved in 
criminal behaviour. It is thus not surprising that nearly one fifth of the total number of homicide 
victims were distributed among these cohorts in the early nineties (González, Vega, Vega, Muñoz, & 
Cabrera, 2009). Since adolescents and young adults aged 18 are also those who enrol in secondary 
and tertiary schools, and these levels of education substantively increased since 1993, we expect 
a large negative effect of secondary and tertiary enrolment rates on violent crime before the Mexican 
Drug War.
Importantly, we expect no effect of education attendance on homicide rates after the onset of the 
drug war, largely because the quality and quantity of violence changed dramatically from common 
forms of interpersonal violence to armed confrontations between criminal organisations (and between 
criminal organisations and the state) that seek to keep or expand control over drug markets (Shirk & 
Wallman, 2015). Since its outbreak, the Mexican Drug War has embodied deadly battles between 
relatively small and well-trained groups with a strong weaponry capacity. Unlike traditional forms of 
interpersonal violence driven by individuals’ motives and a given structure of opportunities, drug- 
related violence draws on organisational imperatives, where violence emerges from criminal organi-
sations’ incentives that are commonly shaped by government law enforcement policies, cocaine 
seizures in other countries, and availability of arms, among others (e.g. Castillo, Mejia, & Restrepo, 
2020; Dube, Dube, & García-Ponce, 2013). Since education attendance influences incentives for 
criminal activity and interpersonal violence and not decisions of criminal organisations shaping 
trends of drug-related homicides, we anticipate a negative effect of schooling on homicide before 
the onset of the drug war, but no relationship after outbreak of drug violence. The following 
hypotheses summarise our argument:  
H1: Secondary and tertiary school enrolment will reduce homicide rates before the onset of the 
drug war.  
H2: Secondary and tertiary school enrolment have no effect on homicide rates after the onset of the 
drug war. 
5. Baseline estimates
We assess our argument using panel data for Mexico’s 31 states and Mexico City over the period 
1990–2015, given data availability on school attendance and economic covariates. The state-year is 
our unit of analysis because most of our data are available only at the state-level as the lowest level of 
aggregation. We hasten to note that there may be considerable variation in crime rates across the 
municipalities within states. However, since aggregation to higher levels will tend to decrease 
variation and may average over divergent trends over lower-level units, this would be more likely 
to obscure relationship than to generate spurious findings.
We measure violent crime using homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants, using data from the 
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the National Population Council 
(CONAPO).9 Our key independent variables are educational attendance in secondary and tertiary 
public schools, based on data from the Secretary of Public Education (SEP). We measure secondary 
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enrolment dividing the total number of students that attend secondary public schools by the total 
population of the 13–15 years old cohort. Similarly, we estimate tertiary enrolment dividing the total 
number of students in tertiary public schools by the total population of the 16–18 years old cohort. 
We detail the data and report descriptive statistics in Tables A2–A3 in the Appendix.
Table 1 reports results of OLS estimates of homicide rates for all Mexican states. We control for 
GDP per capita (logged), economic growth, urban population (logged), youth bulges, and democracy. 
All estimates include unit and year fixed effects to control for unobserved state characteristics and 
other factors like income inequality and police capacity that move slowly across time, and we do not 
include in the estimates due to the lack of data availability. Models 1–2 present results for the 1990– 
2015 period; we do not include secondary and tertiary school enrolment simultaneously given the 
high correlation between them (.85). Then we report different models for the periods before and after 
the drug war onset, allowing us to assess different effects of education attendance on different forms 
of homicide (Models 3–6). This approach is similar to estimating an interaction between the time 
period and school attendance since the year fixed effects subsume the time period constituent term, at 
the same time it considers that the effect of the other covariates differs before and after the drug war 
onset. To be clear, the Mexican Drug War officially started on December 2006, but the rise of 
criminal violence took place until 2008. In fact, 2007 has been the least violent year since 1990, 
thereby we first consider the 1990–2007 period in Models 3–4.
The coefficients for secondary and tertiary school enrolment are negative and statistically sig-
nificant when we consider the period 1990–2015. Consistent with our hypotheses, however, Models 
3–6 show that the crime-reducing effect of education only holds for secondary school enrolment in 
the period before the drug war onset, as the coefficient for secondary schooling is statistically 
significant at conventional levels in Model 3.10 Substantively, the results show that a one standard 
deviation increase in secondary school enrolment, which corresponds to 12 percentage points, 
reduces homicides rates by 2.3. Considering that school enrolment in the pre-drug war period 
Table 1. Two-way fixed effects estimates of homicide rates  
Pre and post drug war onset Pre drug war onset Post drug war onset
1 2 3 4 5 6
Secondary enrolment −0.250* −0.192+ 0.249
(0.101) (0.112) (0.366)
Tertiary enrolment −0.309+ −0.133 −0.185
(0.159) (0.146) (0.302)
Ln GDP pc 7.077 9.276+ 3.056 4.812 −27.169 −25.653
(4.794) (5.104) (5.995) (5.927) (19.586) (18.798)
Economic growth −5.637 −8.001 0.745 −1.947 10.763 9.961
(7.712) (7.937) (5.818) (5.763) (16.600) (15.927)
Urban population −0.000 −0.000 −0.000* −0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Youth bulges −1.607+ −1.554 −1.246 −1.334 0.004 −0.627
(0.917) (0.967) (0.852) (0.881) (1.768) (2.063)
Democracy −0.745 −1.542 2.424* 2.074+ −3.058 −3.622
(1.341) (1.105) (1.154) (1.092) (2.988) (2.943)
Constant 1.874 −27.792 31.617 3.486 301.213 339.009
(63.781) (67.389) (86.560) (83.495) (224.716) (243.221)
R2 0.257 0.258 0.521 0.509 0.231 0.230
Unit and year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. of groups 32 32 32 32 32 32
Observations 800 800 512 512 288 288
Clustered Standard Errors by state in parentheses. FE not shown. 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10. 
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increased from 67 to approximately 90, the reduction in homicide rates corresponds to approximately 
5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. This reduction is substantive considering that homicide rates 
went from 16 to 9 in the same period. In turn, the coefficient for tertiary schooling is negative as 
expected but loses its significance in Models 4 and 6, when we break the sample before and after the 
drug war onset. A plausible explanation for this non-finding is that the education reform caused 
a rapid and substantial increase in secondary school enrolment but the parallel positive effect of the 
reform on tertiary education was not immediate, and thus the impact of tertiary schooling on 
homicide is unlikely to be seen once we break the sample and consider the period 1990–2007.
Overall, the results from Table 1 are consistent with our claim that school attendance is more likely 
to influence individuals’ incentives for crime and interpersonal violence, instead of drug-related 
homicides that tend to follow the organisational incentives of drug cartels. Finally, we anticipated 
a homicide decline as a consequence of increasing enrolment in secondary and tertiary schools, 
drawing on extensive evidence that adolescents and young adults are much more likely to participate 
in non-violent and violent crime and considering the age composition structure of Mexico in the early 
1990s. The models reported above provide support for this argument, however, if our argument is 
correct, we should not expect a relationship between primary school enrolment and homicide rates. 
This simple placebo test yields additional support for our argument since we find that higher primary 
school enrolment does not predict to lower homicide rates (see Model 2, Table A5 in the Appendix).
6. IV estimates
The previous analyses provide suggestive evidence of a pacifying effect of education, but the 
potential endogenous relationship remains a challenge in establishing the homicide-reducing effect 
of education. In the remainder we only focus on the 1990–2007 period, as we found strong evidence 
that the school enrolment does not affect homicide after drug war onset, when the logic of violence 
changed as a result of inter-cartel competition.
Decisions about schooling may be related to unobserved characteristics that affect decisions about 
participation in criminal activities. Moreover, governments in high crime contexts are likely to 
allocate more resources to the criminal-justice system and this may lead to a reduction in education 
expenditures, yielding a spurious correlation between schooling and crime. We address this challenge 
using an instrumental variable approach. Because the compulsory schooling reform was national and 
implemented in all states the same year and there is no variation across units, we exploit a different 
source of variation across units and over time, identifying the cumulative proportion of the population 
that was treated by the reform over time and the growth in secondary schools that took place after the 
reform. Specifically, we identify the cumulative share of male individuals in each state who were 
treated by the reform by measuring the share of male individuals who are 16 years old or older in 
each year, and who were 15 years old or younger in 1993. We consider that the size of the treated 
cohort by the reform provides sufficient exogenous variation and meets the relevance and exclusion 
restrictions. It affects school enrolment because the size of the identified cohort was the main target 
of the reform that made secondary school compulsory. Similarly, the introduction of the reform aimed 
at a specific group of the youth population provides strong theoretical reasons to believe that the size 
of the treated cohort affected homicide rates only through school enrolment.
We also include the number of secondary schools in each state. Although it is unlikely that school 
investment was randomly allocated after the reform, one could question whether previous decisions 
regarding school infrastructure were determined by homicide rates, either because the government 
could have attempted to reduce crime by improving the education or because high crime contexts 
could have dissuaded the government from building new schooling infrastructure.11 However, 
descriptive evidence at the state-level suggests that policy decisions about schooling infrastructure 
were not determined by pre-existing homicide (see the Online Appendix, Figures A4-A5). We thus 
exploit the fact that the education reform positively affected infrastructure of secondary schools, 
while educational infrastructure was unrelated with previous homicide rates.
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Table 2 reports results from our IV estimates, considering the period before the drug war onset. 
Models include unit fixed effects and exclude year fixed effects since one of our instruments – treated 
cohort – incorporates the year effect.12 The first-stage results across models show that our instru-
ments have the expected positive effect on enrolment rates; the reduced form models indicate that the 
instruments are negatively correlated with homicide rates, except for tertiary schools (see the 
Appendix, Table A4). Turning to the second-stage results, the coefficient for secondary school 
enrolment in Model 1.2 is negative and statistically significant, yielding additional support for our 
argument. The underidentification test from the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic indicates that the 
instruments are relevant, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions 
are valid for secondary school enrolment, based on the Hansen J statistic. Substantively, Model 1.2 
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in secondary school enrolment reduces homicide rates 
by 6. This effect is substantively large if we consider that homicides rates declined by 9 homicides 
per 100,000 between 1992 and 2007. Although the coefficient of tertiary school enrolment is negative 
Table 2. IV estimates of homicide rates  

























Treated cohort 57.662*** 84.034*** 57.170***
(8.903) (6.428) (8.696)








Ln GDP pc −3.502 1.534 3.739+ 6.830* −3.469 1.933
(2.401) (3.092) (2.081) (3.076) (2.434) (3.129)
Economic growth −0.744 −1.348 −4.264 −2.924 −0.742 −1.483
(3.390) (3.796) (2.792) (3.559) (3.396) (3.847)
Urban population −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Youth bulges −0.811** −0.720** −0.153 −0.291 −0.815** −0.700**
(0.298) (0.259) (0.252) (0.264) (0.293) (0.260)
Democracy 1.418* 2.369*** −0.478 1.108+ 1.418* 2.390***
(0.607) (0.645) (0.487) (0.637) (0.607) (0.653)
HCI 0.039 0.429+
(0.226) (0.222)
Constant 137.469*** 54.508 −3.725 −43.480 137.033*** 49.228
(33.253) (42.696) (29.480) (39.943) (33.854) (43.252)
R2 0.820 0.818 0.817
F-statistic 68.703 63.682 67.750
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic
70.267 74.731 83.311
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.274 20.707 0.757
χ2 p-value 0.601 0.000 0.384
Unit FE Yes Yes Yes
No. of groups 32 32 32
Observations 512 512 512
Unit fixed effects not shown. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10. 
10 K. S. Gleditsch et al.
and significant and the instrument is relevant based on the underidentification test, the Hansen 
J statistic suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are 
valid for tertiary school enrolment.
In the remainder we consider alternative explanations and perform sensitivity analyses reported in 
Models 3.1 and 3.2. We only focus on secondary school enrolment since we cannot confirm the 
validity of the overidentifying restrictions for tertiary school enrolment (see Model 2.2). First, the 
administration of President Salinas undertook a large-scale poverty relief programme (PRONASOL) 
aimed at improving public goods provision and social development. Although PRONASOL was only 
in effect during the Salinas’ administration (1989–1994), it could be argued that this poverty relief 
programme may have reduced homicide rates in the medium-term due to its effects on social welfare. 
We disagree since there is evidence that PRONASOL had very limited effects on poverty and social 
welfare, largely because the government used PRONASOL to provide benefit to local supporters and 
this undermined the efficiency of the programme in reducing poverty: PRONASOL improved 
provision of basic services only marginally and did not reduce poverty as measured by premature 
infant deaths (Díaz-Cayeros, Estevez, & Magaloni, 2016).
Second, Canada, Mexico, and the United States launched the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. NAFTA was the hallmark of the modernisation project under 
Salinas, and it was expected to promote development and improve economic conditions. It may be 
thus argued that NAFTA influenced homicide rates indirectly via its effect on economic development 
and social welfare. Without disregarding this potential effect, we believe that the general decline in 
homicide cannot be attributed to greater intra-regional commerce since previous studies reveal strong 
clustered patterns; that is, NAFTA tended to improve economic development in Northern states, but 
not the poorer South (Esquivel, Lederman, Messmacher, & Villoro, 2002). In an attempt to rule out 
potential bias in the estimates reported above, in Models 3.1–3.2 we include the human capital index 
(HCI), which helps capture potential indirect effects of PRONASOL and NAFTA on homicide 
reduction.13 As seen in Model 3.2, the sign and size of the coefficient for secondary school enrolment 
is very similar than the coefficient from Model 1.2, and the results for the underidentification test and 
the Hansen J statistic behave as expected, suggesting that our findings do not merely reflect the 
implementation of an extensive anti-poverty programme before the education reform. Importantly, 
these estimations did not alter the substance of our results for secondary enrolment. Tables A(5–6) in 
the Appendix show further robustness tests, controlling for specific time-trends and including 
falsification test to show that our instruments do not predict other outcomes such as the human 
development index, democracy, and economic growth. These results strengthen our confidence that 
the instrument is not simply correlated with other unmeasured features likely to affect homicide rates, 
as well as that primary enrolment rate does not predict to lower homicide rates.
7. Conclusion
Existing research highlights plausible reasons for why education decreases crime, and our results 
offer consistent evidence of a sizeable negative effect of schooling on homicide. The literature 
proposes different channels through which schooling reduces crime and investigating the specific 
mechanisms in more detail deserves more attention in future research. However, our findings have 
important policy implications as education policies can have a pacifying effect by expanding access 
to education. Our strategy to focus on the 1993 compulsory schooling law at the secondary level 
allows us to have greater confidence in the causal identification. The educational reform was 
introduced by the authoritarian government to increase international competitiveness but turned out 
to have important side-effects on homicide. Therefore, this study provides a justification for strategies 
that seek to target crime through investment in education, especially in developing countries where 
educational systems are weakly developed, but even limited amounts of physical capital can go a long 
way in improving education when the cost of human labour is relatively low.
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Whereas much research emphasises the private returns of education to individuals, this study reveals 
evidence that education not only improves human capital with substantive private returns, but also brings 
large social benefits by reducing the aggregate supply of crime and strengthening individual security. 
More broadly, our results support existing studies underlining the social returns and nonproduction 
benefits of education policies (e.g. Dinçer, Kaushal, & Grossman, 2014; Jetter & Parmeter, 2018). These 
findings also challenge so-called mano dura or heavy-handed approaches to crime that are linked to 
human rights violations in many new democracies, and instead point to the relevance of non-coercive or 
‘soft’ responses to public insecurity that can outperform heavy-handed policies.
This article draws attention to an important long-term trend of declining violent crime prior to the 
Mexican Drug War, which has received little attention despite the substantial magnitude of the 
decline, and our evidence suggests that the expansion of education is an important force behind 
this. Some may argue that this is of limited relevance for practical measures to contain the current 
drug-related violence, especially if the previous reform has already realised many of the large gains 
that can be expected from education. But to paraphrase the UK New Labour slogan, efforts to be 
tough on crime alone may be of limited value without also devoting attention to the likely causes of 
crime and long-term influences. The challenges of the drug war will certainly require strengthening 
the state security apparatus and improving the judicial system, but the long-term impact of advances 
in education suggests a more favourable future outlook with regards to the problem of homicide and 
violent crime than what is suggested in many discussions focusing exclusively on drug-related 
violence in Mexico.
Notes
1. We lack available data to report trends in other types of crime such as robbery, theft, and assault, but homicide is the most 
reliable and accurate measure of violent crime (e.g. Cook & Laub, 1998).
2. Longer time-series data on homicide from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) show 




5. The reform also included changes in curricular laws and teachers’ wages and capacitation.
6. Zedillo was Secretary of Education under the Salinas government and played an important role in designing and 
implementing several reforms during the previous administration.
7. There are several possible reasons for why we also see an increase in school enrolment beyond the immediate three years 
following the reform. The reform may not necessarily have been fully implemented immediately, and some in the age range 
may not have enrolled, even if schooling was made compulsory. Second, the reform also increased schooling infrastructure in 
a way that likely increased further recruitment and retention. Finally, because the level of enrolment was relatively low at the 
time when the reform was introduced (less than 70%), the full effects of the reform were likely to be gradual.
8. See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR?view=chart
9. It would be ideal to use either individual level data on perpetrators of crime or homicide rates of young males to better reflect 
the expected effect of education among out-of-school youth. Unfortunately, there is no systematic individual level data on 
perpetrators of criminal activities in Mexico. We also reviewed the available data from the National System of Health 
Information (SINAIS) but we are unfortunately unable to use these, due to the large number of missing values in the number of 
homicides by gender in different age cohorts for Mexican states over the period of analysis, particularly during the 1990s.
10. These results hold in models that omit all control variables, and are robust to the use of conditional poisson estimates with 
both unit and year fixed effects (see the Online Appendix).
11. We return to this issue later but hasten to note for now that allocation of schooling infrastructure likely followed a political 
logic, since there is strong evidence that the PRI used public services provision as a survival strategy to defeat the 
opposition in subnational elections.
12. As described above, the treated cohort variable is created with the year variable and thus it is not appropriate to 
include year dummies in the models.
13. FDI figures are more appropriate to assess the effect of NAFTA but unfortunately there is not available data at the 
subnational level before 2000; hence, we lose more than 50 per cent of the observations.
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Appendix
This Appendix provides further details on measurement, descriptive statistics, and additional empirical estimates. 
Supplementary information can be found in the Online Appendix.





Percentage change in homicide 
rate, 1992–2006
Average in homicide rate, 
2007–2015
Aguascalientes 4.68 2.45 −47.67 4.69
Baja California 17.24 16.18 −6.13 27.53
Baja California 
Sur
5.69 4.91 −13.75 8.53
Campeche 15.66 4.43 −71.75 7.06
Coahuila 11.25 4.69 −58.32 18.53
Colima 29.46 7.65 −74.03 19.85
Chiapas 14.70 13.36 −9.15 7.03
Chihuahua 18.96 19.98 5.38 80.94
Ciudad de 
México
16.39 9.75 −40.53 12.21
Durango 46.69 13.01 −72.13 38.18
Guanajuato 9.13 4.31 −52.76 9.99
Guerrero 61.45 26.00 −57.70 49.98
Hidalgo 6.83 2.06 −69.90 5.45
Jalisco 14.64 7.13 −51.31 13.60
Estado de 
México
38.27 12.90 −66.29 14.30
Michoacán 39.93 25.69 −35.67 17.95
Morelos 30.42 9.56 −68.57 22.21
Nayarit 30.75 11.22 −63.51 24.46
Nuevo León 4.05 4.05 0 17.97
Oaxaca 43.95 15.48 −64.78 17.23
Puebla 13.18 6.71 −49.10 7.23
Queretaro 7.11 4.14 −41.72 5.80
Quintana Roo 9.62 5.81 −39.63 9.95
San Luis Potosí 13.55 6.73 −50.32 10.63
Sinaloa 27.04 18.38 −32.04 45.87
Sonora 13.17 10.63 −19.26 20.40
Tabasco 8.97 7.39 −17.57 8.85
Tamaulipas 20.69 16.63 −19.62 21.87
Tlaxcala 5.74 4.50 −21.59 5.90
Veracruz 12.34 5.24 −57.55 8.81
Yucatan 3.43 2.31 −32.66 2.25
Zacatecas 14.06 6.05 −56.94 14.81
Table A2. Description of CONTROL VARIables  
Variable Description Source
Ln GDP per 
capita
GDP per capita in 1992 pesos (logged) INEGI
Economic 
growth
The growth rate of GDP per capita from the previous year INEGI
Ln urban 
population
Percentage of population living in urban areas INEGI
Youth bulges Percentage of youth males aged 15–24 relative to the total adult population CONAPO
Democracy Coded as democracy since the first election in each state where the 
opposition won, that is, since the failure of the PRI
Based on data 
from CIDAC
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics  
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-drug war onset, 1990–2007
Homicide rates 544 13.542 9.461 1.819 61.45
Secondary school enrolment 544 78.693 12.191 44.602 106.557
Tertiary school enrolment 544 46.234 13.074 17.231 87.448
Ln GDP per capita 544 11.690 .578 10.938 14.217
Economic growth 512 .012 .043 −.157 .146
Urban population 544 2,057,455 2,041831 248,665 1.18e+07
Youth bulges 544 31.746 2.839 24.644 40.139
Democracy 544 .242 .429 0 1
Post-drug war onset, 2008–2015
Homicide rates 288 18.131 20.486 1.791 190.218
Secondary school enrolment 288 94.054 6.836 79.665 121.168
Tertiary school enrolment 288 66.048 9.944 45.681 116.125
Ln GDP per capita 288 11.752 .534 10.912 14.037
Economic growth 288 −.002 .057 −.425 .184
Urban population 288 3,092423 2,841,273 477,196.6 1.65e+07
Youth bulges 288 27.098 1.752 21.295 31.243
Democracy 288 .666 .472 0 1
Table A4. Reduced form models of homicide rates – two-way fixed effects estimates  
1 2 3 4
Treated cohort −36.995+ −70.273** −17.279+ −35.020***
(20.413) (24.046) (8.552) (7.574)
Schools (secondary) −0.014* −0.014+
(0.005) (0.004)
Schools (tertiary) 3.223 2.131 −0.006
(5.398) (6.019) (0.006)
Ln GDP pc −0.727 0.634
(3.957) (4.558)
Economic growth 0.000 −0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Urban population −0.415 −1.082
(0.681) (0.777)






R2 0.511 0.453 0.473 0.392
Unit and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 512 512 512 512
Notes: Models 1–2 include all control covariates, and Model 3–4 exclude all control covariates. 
FE not shown. 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10. 
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Ln GDP per capita 8.660* 5.696
(3.586) (5.601)
Economic growth −4.748 −1.058
(3.411) (5.435)
Urban population −0.000* −0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)













State-specific time trends Yes No
Unit FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered on state. 
Unit and time FE not shown. 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10. 
In Table A5, Model 1 includes state-specific time trends using an 
interaction between state and year; the coefficient for secondary 
school enrolment holds negative and significant. In a placebo test, 
we consider the link between primary school enrolment and homicide 
rates. We do not expect a negative effect on homicide rates, since 
primary schooling does not affect the population that is most likely to 
get involved in criminal activity. Model 2 in Table A5 considers 
primary enrolment rate, for which we do not find a negative coeffi-
cient on homicide rates 
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Table A6. Falsification tests  
Dependent variable
Human development index Democracy Economic growth
1 2 3 4 5 6
Treated cohort −2.046 −1.727 8.141 9.448 0.427 1.533***
(23.602) (21.028) (12.687) (12.898) (0.312) (0.408)
Schools (sec.) 0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln GDP per capita −1.986 0.320 0.151***
(1.496) (0.585) (0.023)
Economic growth 1.691 −0.436
(1.281) (0.477)




Constant 4.811*** 28.946 0.084 −3.696 0.024* −1.743***
(0.610) (17.884) (0.194) (6.879) (0.009) (0.267)
R2 0.522 0.512 0.335 0.331 0.481 0.532
Unit and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512
Table A6 reports three falsification tests to assess whether our instruments predict to the human development 
index, democracy, and economic growth. Models 1, 3, and 5 exclude controls, while Models 2,4, and 6 include 
standard control covariates. We find no evidence that the instruments predict to these variables, strengthening 
our confidence that the instruments are not simply correlated with other unmeasured features likely to affect 
homicide rates. An exception is Model 6, where the instruments have a positive and significant effect on 
economic growth, although the coefficients are not statistically significant in the model without controls 
(Model 5). Moreover, we hasten to note that there is no evidence in both the baseline and IV estimates that 
economic growth does not affect homicide rates. 
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